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LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
C. Charles A. Lofgren*
Raoul Berger has shown an uncanny sense of timing. In the past two
years, he has produced two significant books, one on impeachment and
the other on executive privilege, just as the subjects have become topics
of sustained national debate. In this debate, his scholarship has doubt-
lessly given aid and comfort to those intent on whittling down what
Professor Schlesinger has called the "imperial presidency."185 According-
ly, it would be easy to accuse Professor Berger of putting history to
partisan use. By his own testimony, he admits to having changed his
mind since the mid-1950's about the value of secrecy in government.
For example, he now finds that "[Senator Joseph] McCarthy's horse-
whipping of General Zwicker is hardly to be weighed in the same scales
with Lyndon Johnson's stealthy escalation of our commitment in Viet-
nan.", 8 6
Mr. Berger's works, including his present paper, may be briefs against
executive power; at the outset, though, I think it is important to absolve
him of the charge that his scholarship is merely subservient to the needs
of the moment. His interests in the area of executive power substantially
pre-date recent controversies and, as evidenced by his publications,
extend back to 1965.187 This leads me to one question which will take
Mr. Berger away from his paper itself, but which I believe would be
interesting to have him discuss: How did he come to focus so much of
his attention as early as a decade ago on the area of executive power?
After all, I suspect there lurks in each of us a certain envy of someone
who is able to bring the past to bear significantly on the present.
Let me turn to more substantive questions which I see arising out of
the paper and directly out of United States v. Nixon.18
* Roy P. Crocker, Associate Professor of History, Claremont Men's College.
185. A. ScrLEsiNGER, THm IMPERuAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
186. See note 2 supra.
187. See Congressional Inquiry, supra note 124.
188. In thinking about Mr. Berger's paper, I have benefited from a number of sources,
including Westin, Foreward to UNrrnFu STATES V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BFoRE THE
SUPRE-ME COURT xi (L. Friedman, ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Westin]; Freund, The
Supreme Court 1973 Term-Foreward: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARv. L. REv. 13
(1974); The President, supra note 3; Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HA1v. L. REv. 281
(1974); Winter, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 1730 (1974); "Executive Privilege, Yes or
No?," Lecture given by Alpheus T. Mason, Pomona College, Claremont, California, Feb.
20, 1975. See generally A Symposium on United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1
(1974).
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UNITED STATES v. NIXON
Mr. Berger remarks that "[a]gainst the sleazy background of 'White
House Horrors' and Nixon's resort to 'executive privilege' in order to
conceal his participation in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, it is remark-
able that the Court should have chosen the occasion to legitimate and
anoint [executive privilege] .... "189 But to the extent that a con-
textual element deserves stressing, I wonder if the element making the
opinion remarkable was not instead the Courfs apparently favorable
strategic position in rendering its decision. Mr. Berger takes note of this
favorable position, and he is surely correct. Compared with the situation
in 1952 when the Steel Seizure Case1 90 was decided, the Court in 1974
could count on fairly complete national support in taking a stand against
the executive branch.
To put the matter differently, if there is no sound basis for a constitu-
tional claim of privilege, then the opinion in United States v. Nixon is
indeed questionable for its handling of the central constitutional issue it
addresses. Moreover, even if a firmer basis can be found for executive
privilege, the fact remains that the Court's opinion is still deficient in
that it mainly asserts, but does not demonstrate, the existence of such a
basis. As Mr. Berger stated in his article, The Incarnation of Executive
Privilege:9' "[E]ven more than an historian, the Court is called upon
to take discrepant evidence into account, to explain why it is given no
weight."'192 In this regard, there is a revealing contrast: When Chief
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison 93 claimed the power of judicial
review, he was advancing a claim which his contemporaries evidently
found quite unremarkable. 94 He nevertheless went to some length to
defend his position. Chief Justice Burger, despite real debate over the
point at issue, almost summarily found that "a presumptive privilege for
presidential communications . .. is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution."' 95 Absent is any notion of opposing evidence; absent
is reasoned exploration which gives a court's decision force beyond
189. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
190. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
191. See Incarnation of Executive Privilege, supra note 3.
192. Id. at 11.
193. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
194. See, e.g., 1 C. WARREN, THn SUPREME COURT IN UNnu STATES HISTORY 231-
268 (rev. ed. 1926). It was, of course, Marshall's dictum that Marbury was entitled to his
commission-not the claim to judicial review-which aroused contemporary debate. Id.
See also R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRIsIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 53-68 (1971).
195. 418 U.S. at 708.
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being the fiat of a handful of appointed judges. If we can conclude that
the Court possessed a national constituency in and out of Congress
which was ready for a full and reasoned exploration, then the "Tapes
Case" was truly remarkable.
I want to be "perfectly clear"; it is valuable to examine, as Mr. Berger
has done, whether the Court had adequate grounds for its decision. In
fact, it is a necessary first step. What I mean to suggest is that besides
assessing the Court's opinion in this manner, and in large part because
this approach arguably reveals the opinion as deficient, the constitution-
al historian might well go a step further and ask why the Court took the
position it did, in the manner it did, and at a time when external factors
were apparently conducive to a fuller exploration.
Toward the end of his paper, Mr. Berger briefly mentioned an
explanation which has been advanced by several Court watchers, and
which I too wish to develop.196 Their suggestion is that the opinion
carries all the marks of a joint-you might say "committee-drawn"-
effort. The Court, they have theorized, perceived that it had to speak
with one voice or it might invite presidential resistance. Professor Wil-
liam Van Alstyne notes that a "delicate exchange"'197 occurred during
oral argument of the case. Asked if the President was leaving the matter
of the subpoena to the Court to decide, presidential attorney James St.
Clair replied: "Yes, in a sense." When asked, "In what sense?" he said,
"In the sense that this Court has the obligation to determine the law.
The President also has an obligation to carry out his constitutional
duties." Seconds later, St. Clair reaffirmed, "This is being submitted to
this Court for its guidance and judgment with respect to the law. The
President, on the other hand, has his obligations under the Constitu-
tion." 98
Thus, beyond its undoubted awareness of speculation in the press over
whether the President would obey a court order, the Court was further
warned of the potential difficulties it faced. In this situation, as Profes-
sor Paul Mishkin has written, even concurring opinions "could diffuse
the impact of the Court's judgment. . ... 199 Moreover, given the ex-
istence of a majority in favor of production of the tapes, any justice
otherwise inclined to dissent must have paused at the thought that di-
vision would hurt the Court's overall institutional position.
196. I here draw freely from Mishkin, supra note 85, at 76, 86-9; Van Alstyne, supra
note 82, at 116, 120-23; Westin, supra note 188, at xv-xvi.
197. Van Alstyne, supra note 82, at 123.
198. Id.
199. Mishkin, supra note 85, at 87.
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Significantly, in attempting to reconstruct what happened in confer-
ence on the basis of "court sources" reported in the press, Professor
Allan Westin suggests that four Justices initially favored "a broad
opinion limiting the concept of executive privilege .... 200 Yet all
members of the Court recognized the value of unanimity, and accord-
ingly each justice had immense bargaining power. Hence, to simplify the
give and take over specific issues, we find emerging into the final
opinion the not easily reconciled assertions both of constitutional privi-
lege and of the requirement that the privilege yield to the needs of the
judiciary for evidence.20 1 Both sides thereby gained something. In the
process the Court was able to skirt the touchy issue of the President's
status as an unindicted co-conspirator; this was an issue which would
have required exploration had the President's privilege been treated as
merely an evidentiary privilege.
Someday, of course, we may have better accounts of the "why" of the
opinion in the "Tapes Case." I mean primarily to suggest here that of
the deficiencies of the opinion, combined with the Court's favorable
national support base in the case, leads one to ask "Why"? Parentheti-
cally, however, one should also note that the necessity-for-unanimity
explanation tends to call into question whether the Court actually saw
itself in the strong position in which others have viewed it.
In looking at executive privilege in light of United States v. Nixon, a
further question arises: What effect did the decision have upon the
position of Congress vis-a-vis the other branches? As a matter of law,
it would seem that Congress in an impeachment proceeding certainly
has a claim on evidence as strong as the claim the Court asserted for
the judicial branch, and probably a stronger one. But what of the impact
of the decision on the "working!' constitution? Would Congress have
emerged in a better position had the impeachment process run its course
without being aborted by a court-induced resignation? Relatedly, would
Congress' position have been better sustained in the absence of the
Court's quotation of Marshall's view in Marbury that "it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is"? 20 2 Professor Gerald Gunther argues that the Court's reiteration of
this claim influenced a number of congressmen on the Judiciary Com-
mittee, and made them less willing to accept the notion that contempt of
the Committee's efforts to obtain evidence was itself an independent
200. Westin, supra note 188, at xvi.
201. 418 U.S. at 707, 711-13.
202. 418 U.S. at 703, 705, quoting 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 70.
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impeachable offense. 203 Instead, says Gunther, the Court's use of Mar-
shall's statement encouraged the congressmen to see such contempt as a
matter for the courts to rule upon.204
While these questions take one beyond the immediate focus of Mr.
Berger's paper, they flow from it and go to the issue of the historical
significance of United States v. Nixon, including its influence on the
actual constitution of government in America. This is, indeed, an impor-
tant problem in constitutional history.
203. Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and
the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 30, 33-38 (1974).
204. Id. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 82, at 124-27.
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